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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the demand and cost structure of the French market of 
academic journals, taking into account its intermediary role between 
researchers, who are both producers and consumers of knowledge.  This two 
sidedness feature echoes similar problems such as the chicken and egg 
problem Here readers don’t buy a journal if they do not expect its articles to 
be academically relevant and researchers do not submit to a journal with 
either limited public reach or weak reputation.  After the merging of several 
databases, we estimate the aggregated nested logit demand system combined 
simultaneously with a cost function.  We identify the structural parameters 
of this market and find that price elasticities of demand are quite large and 
margins relatively low, indicating that this industry experiences competitive 
constraints. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper analyzes the demand and cost structure of the French 
market of academic journals, taking into account its intermediary role 
between researchers, who are both producers and consumers of knowledge.  
This two sidedness feature echoes similar problems, such as the chicken and 
egg problem already observed in other markets: Readers do not buy a journal 
if they do not expect its articles to be academically relevant and researchers, 
who live under the mantra “Publish or Perish”, do not submit to a journal 
with either limited readership or weak reputation.  Therefore, while on the 
consumer side, journals compete for subscriptions, on the producer side, 
journals compete for papers that would maximize the expected number of 
citations.  In this context, journals have their price settled according to their 
ability to attract academically relevant articles.1 
Taking academic journals as differentiated products, we rely on the 
recent developments of the empirical Industrial Organization literature to 
estimate an aggregated nested logit demand combined simultaneously with a 
pricing function under the assumption of Bertrand competition.  In other 
words, we assume publishers adopt the readers-pay business model and that 
the subscription pricing policies are determined oligopolistically.  
Furthermore, by recognizing that the impact factor - our measure of journal’s 
number of citations – is determined by the public reach and the reputation of 
the journal, we introduce an additional equation that is able to capture the 
two-sidedness feature of the industry. 
Based on the merging of two important price databases, EBSCO and 
SWETS, together with the Journal of Citations Report edited by ISI, we 
collected data covering the yearly subscription of journals by French 
universities from several domains of sciences and social sciences and their 
characteristics for the period 1994 to 2004.  We can show that French 
universities’ subscriptions are substantially elastic to the price of journal, 
with publishers seizing a relatively low mark-up.  The data also strongly 
supports the two-sidedness feature of academic journals.   
 
Academic Journals as Two Sided Platforms 
 
The standard two-sided market models share a common feature.2 All 
stress the fact that platforms that link two types of traders by some means are 
valued by the potential sizes of these two groups of users.  As such, the 
                                                 
1 To our knowledge, the first theoretical models that recognize the two-sidedness feature of 
the academic journals market were developed by McCabe and Snyder (2005) and Jeon and 
Rochet (2006). Our empirical study relates to McCabe and Snyder’s theoretical model with 
regard to the journal’s technology.    
2 See Rochet and Tirole (2003 and 2005) for a presentation of this new paradigm and latest 
developments.  
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platforms’ pricing policy take network effects into account, adjusting its 
price structure according to the willingness-to-pay of each side of the 
market.  An increase in prices on one side directly reduces its users’ 
participation, which, in turn, reduces the expected gain from the other side of 
the platform.    
One of our goals here is to assess the extent to which this paradigm 
applies to the market for academic journals.  Academic researchers are both 
producers and consumers of knowledge.  As a platform, an academic journal 
not only plays the traditional role of information flow management (i.e.; 
research output dissemination), but it also certifies the articles they publish.  
Usually, the larger the number of citations a journal obtains, the stronger its 
attractiveness among readers.  For that reason, journals compete for the best 
articles through referee committees, which screen the submitted articles. 
Now, the academic research community has strongly benefited from 
the decreasing costs of information processing and telecommunications, 
which boosted up the research output proportionally.  Such phenomena, 
combined with the need for a faster access to scientific literature, has raised 
tensions on the functioning of the traditional printed journals.   
In this context, observers remark a lasting movement towards a 
reorganization of the academic journals.  The publishers reacted in twofold 
ways:  On the researchers’ side, established publishers have launched new 
academic journals; on the readers and librarians’ side, the publishers 
proposed several value-added services and special journal packages.  We 
briefly comment them in what follows. 
Concerning the researchers’ side, the reply to the increasing research 
output, driven by the sharp decrease of research costs, has been the creation 
of new journals, especially among for profit journals, in order to adjust to the 
differentiation of new research fields and the increased variance of the 
research quality.3 
As regard the readers’ side, a typical contract between a library and a 
publisher would entail simple print and/or electronic versions, with some 
added value services to libraries.  In particular, one initiative known as the 
Big Deal, which differs from publisher to publisher, consists of a multi-year 
contract that bundles the journal’s printed version to its electronic one and 
has a limiting policy regarding cancellation of subscriptions.  Generally, this 
contract would be tied to the library, but also, publishers frequently would 
propose clauses based on the library’s previous subscriptions record.4 
In summary, the two-sidedness nature of academic journals, that is 
to say, dissemination on one side towards researchers/consumers and 
certification on the other side to researchers/producers have been responsible 
for the impact of the electronic revolution on the dynamics of the market of 
                                                 
3 See Case, 2004, p.2 and Dewatripont et alii, 2005, p.44. 
4 See Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) for a discussion on the Big Deal as a strategic barrier to 
entry. 
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academic journals, i.e., creation of new journals and the design of new 
contracts. 
 
The Data 
 
Our database combines several sources.  The annual levels of 
subscription per journal are obtained from the information network of all 
French university libraries, ABES (Agence Bibliographique de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur), from 1994 to 2004.  Other journals’ 
characteristics are obtained from the merger of two annual publications of 
the Journal of Citation Reports (JCR herein), (1) the Sciences Edition from 
1994 to 2003 and (2) the Social Sciences Editions from 1994 to 1997, 1999 
and 2003.  They include the total number of citations, impact factor, number 
of issues and articles, publisher and its nationality and fields covered.  The 
journals are selected according to their fields’ importance in the database.  
The covered fields are Business, Chemistry, Computer Science, Economics, 
Engineering, Mathematics, Medicine Probability and Statistics, Physics and 
Psychology. 
The price variable is the combination of listed institutional 
subscription prices given by the two main firms distributing journals in 
France, EBSCO and Swets Information Services.  Notably, the available 
price schedules are based on per journal subscription, which abstracts from 
any of the quantity discounts publishers usually offer libraries or the types of 
media (printed and/or electronic) included.5 
An important drawback of this work is the lack of data on the costs 
of publishers.  As an alternative, we construct some proxy cost variables 
based on the journals and publishers’ information.  These variables include 
field and editor dummies, number of subscribed journals proposed by the 
publisher, the nationality of the publisher, number of issues per year, and 
some interactions between these variables.  We also include a dummy for 
not-for-profit publishers.6 
The following tables provide summary descriptive statistics of 
variables that are used in the specifications we discuss below.  These 
variables include prices (in real dollars 2000), market shares, price per total 
number of citations and per impact factor, and number of journals. 
Table I gives the mean and median market shares and prices of the 
journals.  Although our definition of market share and our price adjustment 
algorithm have inflated the statistics for the period 1998-2000, some trends 
are obvious.  The median market share of a journal has been decreasing 
steadily in the last ten years and prices have not changed significantly.  The 
median ratio between price and journal’s citation and between price and unit 
                                                 
5 We control for the type of media using a step dummy for the year main publishers started 
offering the journal’s electronic version.  See Case (2004) 
6 Not For Profit journals are all journals that belong to a University Press or Society type of 
publisher. 
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impact factor have remained constant (if not decreasing) during the sampled 
period.  
 
Table I: Descriptive statistics 
Market Shares Price Price per citation  
Price per impact 
factor  
 
Year 
Mean (a) Mean Mean (c) Median Mean (c) Median 
Number of 
journals 
1994 0.0007188 1076.3 2.3573 0.3474 2.3573 0.3474 772 
1996 0.0006314 1119.6 1.8538 0.3370 1.8538 0.3370 872 
1998 0.0016411 1648.2 3.0818 0.3929 3.0818 0.3929 303 
2000 0.0024651 1517.9 2.4624 0.4053 2.4624 0.4053 253 
2002 0.0005142 964.08 1.0248 0.2744 1.0248 0.2744 1037 
 2004 0.0004421 1105.4 1.1782 0.4575 1.1782 0.4575 1254 
Notes:  (a) The market share of a journal j at time t is defined as the number of universities 
that have at least one of its libraries subscribing to j at time t divided by the total number of 
journals available at time t. (b) The impact factor is a measure of the importance of citations 
of a journal which is the ratio of total cites in a current year of articles published in a given 
journal the previous two years over the total number of articles published the previous two 
years. (c) Computed averages for 1998 and 2004. 
 
Table II: Subscribed journals’s characteristics per field (medians) 
Fields Impact Factor
Number of 
Articles 
Price in 2000 
dollars 
Market Share 
% 
Mathematics 0.55294 60 552.61 9 
Economics 0.58974 39 321.33 6 
Engineering 0.61716 103 569.07 12 
Computer Science 0.62000 54 648.07 4 
Probability and Statistics 0.65809 49.5 210.49 3 
Business 0.68493 38 306.49 3 
Psychology 1.25022 41 280.79 4 
Physics 1.37632 194 1379.14 5 
Chemistry 1.68600 240 1394.37 7 
Medicine 1.84971 150.5 443.54 47 
 
The journals listed in JCR are characterized by up to 5 subfields of 
science.  From a total of 219 subfields, we have selected the 10 most 
frequent domains of science by grouping the subfields into its respective 
major field.   
Table II provides per field medians over some important journal’s 
characteristics.  We find that some fields have a different citation dynamics 
than others and that median prices differ considerably across fields.  Given 
these characteristics, field specificity seems relevant to properly capture the 
network effect of academic journals.  We address it in our estimates. 
We finally turn to the publishers characteristics.  Because the 
Academic Publishing industry has considerably seized the mergers and 
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acquisitions wave of the 90’s, we have chosen the most representative of the 
sample and controlled for their merger activity.  From a total of 262 
publishers, we selected: the ten largest ones. (See below.) 
 
Econometric Specification and Estimation 
 
This model borrows from the recent developments on the empirical 
Industrial Organization of differentiated products.7 The representative 
consumer is a university library, which decides for buying one of the 
available academic journals, based on the researchers it represents, which 
varies according to field and to the quality of their research output. The 
library might also buy an outside alternative or not buy any journal at all. 
The nested demand framework assumes products are classified in G 
different groups plus the group corresponding to the outside alternative.  In 
the context of academic journals, journals are classified according to 
different fields of science.  In this framework, journals of the same field are 
closer substitutes than journals outside the field.  The utility of subscribing a 
journal j by consumer i is the sum of the average utility of journal j, jδ , 
which is common to all consumers, and a composite random component 
(1 )ig jtε σ ε+ − . The average utility is decomposed in three parts (the time 
subscript t is omitted for the sake of simplicity): 
 j j j j jX I pδ β ρ α ξ= + − + . (1) 
The first part, βjX , includes the  journal’s characteristics in βjX  such as 
number of articles, number of issues, field, dummies for major publishers, 
their nationality, year dummies and some interactions between them.  The 
second part, Ij, includes the quality of the journal, that is, the scientific 
importance of its published papers.  The third part is the price of the journal, 
where the parameter α represents the disutility of price of a journal and 
should be positive.  Finally jξ  represents the unobserved components of 
quality. 
The error component of the utility function, igε  and ijε , are random 
variables that reflect the difference between the consumer’s individual 
appraisal over the journal and the average payoff it delivers, represented by 
jδ .  Notably, igε  is common to all journals belonging to the same field g 
and ijε  is specific to the journal j itself.  The multiplicative parameter σ  
ranges between 0 and 1 and denotes the degree of intragroup correlation, 
which measures the correlation of the consumer’s utility from journals that 
belong to the same field.  The closer this parameter is to one, the higher the 
chance the consumer will switch to another journal within the same field 
when its price increases.  The closer σ  is to zero, the consumer does not 
                                                 
7 See Berry (1994) and Nevo (1997) among many others. 
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make distinction between fields when subscribing a journal, and it 
approximates the standard logit model, where all journals are symmetric.   
The library i subscribes the journal j that maximizes her utility.  In 
order to obtain a closed form probability that a library subscribes a journal j, 
the nested model assumes that both igε  and ijε  are such that its composite 
term (1 )ig jtε σ ε+ −  follows an extreme value distribution.  The average 
utility of the outside alternative is normalized to zero, that is, 00 =δ .  At 
the aggregate level, such probability js  coincides with the market share of 
the journal j.  The total number of subscriptions of journal j, say jq  , is 
directly given by expression j jq s N= .  Following Berry (1994), we can 
write the demand equation as follows: 
 0ln ln lnj j j j jg js s X I p sβ ρ α σ ξ− = + − + + , (2) 
where jgs  is the market of journal j in group g and 0s  is the market share of 
the outside good.  Given our definition of market share of a journal, we 
include as outside good all the journals that were not subscribed at period t, 
though they were available in the previous years. 
We assume that each publisher f produces a set of journals Ff.  Its 
net profit is the sum of its operational profits minus a fixed cost K.  The 
operational profit of journal j is equal to the product of its total subscriptions 
and the margin, that is, the price pj minus the marginal cost cj of journal j.   
Assuming that publishers compete in prices à la Nash-Bertrand and given 
the nested logit specification of the demand, the pricing equation for each 
journal j is given by: 
 1
(1 (1 ) )j j fg f
p c
s s
σ
α σ σ
−= − − − − , (3) 
where fgs  is the publisher f’s market share in field g; fs  is the publisher f’s 
overall market share and jc is the (constant) marginal cost of journal j.  The 
marginal cost of a journal j is parameterized as: )exp( jjj wc ωγ += , where 
wj is the vector of the deterministic part of the journal’s characteristics, γ  is 
the technological parameters to be estimated and jω  is an unobserved 
random part.  The deterministic part includes a constant term, number of 
issues per year, number of journals subscribed per publisher, dummies for 
fields, years, major publishers, nationality of the publisher, for non for profit 
journals and some interactions between them.  For the reasons already 
discussed, we also include the impact factor as cost characteristic and we 
expect its effect to be negative on costs.   
In the context of two-sided markets, we aim at approximating the 
value of a journal by the lagged impact factor.  The full model is 
characterized by the addition of the following equation:  
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 1jt jt j jtI I Z uλ θ−= + + , (4) 
where itI  the impact factor of journal j at time t, 1jtI −  is the lagged impact 
factor of the journal j. The parameter λ  would be capturing the network 
effect of the past readership of the journal.  jZ  is a vector of journals’ 
characteristics, which includes the number of articles and issues per year, a 
dummy for non-for-profit journals, some field dummies, a step dummy 
indicating a change of publisher.  
 
Estimation Results  
We now estimate different models, from the simplest model where 
the impact factor is treated as an exogenous variable to the most complete 
model where, in addition to the nested logit demand (Equation 2) and the 
pricing Equation (3), we take into account the impact factor equation (4). 
This last model is called the Full Model. To estimate these models we use 
different set of instruments.8 By running these different models, we have 
observed that not recognizing the endogenous character of the impact factor 
yields a zero correlation between impact factor and the demand for journals.  
This result is counterintuitive since it implies that subscriptions would be 
unrelated with the impact factor, which is a celebrated measure of the quality 
of a journal.  Once we allow for the impact factor to be endogenous, its 
effect on demand becomes statistically significant and with the expected 
positive sign. Notably, in the Full Model, which captures the network effect 
through the journal’s previous impact factor, this effect is positive and 
highly significant.   
While the parameter α  varies very little across the model 
specifications, the same is not true for the estimated σ , our measure of 
intragroup correlation, which ranges from 0.91 to 0.95 under the full model.  
The associated first R-squares, which roughly speaking measures the 
fraction of the variation of prices (α ) and market shares (σ ) that are 
explained through the instruments, also changes considerably and for both 
parameters.  The implications of such change on our structural estimates for 
demand and costs echo the theory’s prediction that the market becomes more 
competitive when two-sidedness is accounted. 
The cost-side parameters have the expected signs for all the model 
specifications. The coefficient for the impact factor is significantly positive 
and, once taken as an endogenous variable, it becomes negative and 
statistically different from zero.  If one takes such variable as a measure of 
the talent of journals, we verify that journals indeed differ with respect to 
their talent to select articles. 
 
                                                 
8 A complete set of estimation results, as well as the set of instruments, is available 
from the authors. 
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Empirical Analysis 
Table III compares the key structural estimates derived from the 
model where impact factor is exogenous (Model 1) with the results from our 
Full Model (Model 2).  We have captured a remarkable feature with the 
available data:  Our estimates reveal that the demand for academic journals 
is highly elastic, under both scenarios.  On the top of that, the estimated 
elasticity increases once we introduce the impact factor equation, 
corroborating the results obtained in the two-sidedness theoretical literature.  
As discussed in a previous section, an increase in prices creates a 
multiplicative effect since it directly reduces the number of (paying) readers 
which in turn reduces the expected gain from researchers to publish in the 
journal. 
The estimates for the marginal cost do not vary much from one 
specification to the other.  However the pricing policy and therefore the 
mark-up changes considerably, decreasing by 43%, when we use the Full 
Model.  Nevertheless, given that the estimated elasticities are already very 
high under the Model 2, the estimated average mark-ups are low, around 
9.8%, and reduce to 5.5%. The median of the annual marginal cost of a 
journal is around $668 (2000 USD) and its average is close to $1081 under 
the Full Model.9  Furthermore, the aggregated elasticity, almost does not 
changed from one model to the other since α  does not change significantly.  
Its estimated value is 0.52. 
We can also provide estimates at the publisher level.  For our 
selected publishers, the median ranged from 1.7% to 7.3%, while the overall 
median economic margin is around 4%. 
 
Table III: Estimated demand and cost parameters 
 Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity Marginal Cost Mark Up (%) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Model 1 -29.02 -18.28 0.526 0.108 1058.64 645.10 9.80 6.92 
Model 2 -52.27 -32.94 0.987 0.203 1081.26 668.69 5.56 3.85 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we fit a structural model of the market for academic 
journals to a data set of French libraries. Our main findings are the 
following. Firstly, we find that library subscriptions are substantially elastic 
to the price of journals. Although the lack of some information on prices of a 
number of journals and the lack of better information about the editing and 
                                                 
9 We can also provide estimates at the publisher level.  For our selected publishers, the 
median ranged from 1.7% to 7.3%, while the overall median economic margin is around 4%. 
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publishing costs per journal prevent us to identify more precisely the 
structural parameters on this market, we are able to identify the crucial 
structural parameters estimates.  We find that both own and cross price 
elasticities of demand are quite large and margins relatively low, indicating 
that this industry experiences competitive constraints. Also, our data confirm 
the relevance of the two-sidedness on the industry. Secondly, we find that 
journals differ across their ability to select good articles.  A high quality 
journal normally enjoys lower costs of hiring a high level editorial board and 
motivated referees.  It is expected that these journals require lower effort to 
publish a good selection of articles.  We cannot confirm the common 
perception that NFP journals have lower costs than FP journals.  
The results obtained in this paper are striking and original.  They 
have implications not only on the way the competition analysis of the 
industry should be carried out but also on the way publishers affect the 
scientific output as a certification vector and as a dissemination one.   
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